‘WATCH HOW YOU’RE EATING’:
JUDAS AND JESUS AND TABLE MANNERS
An intertextual reading of John 13:26, Matthew 26:23 and Sirach 31:12-32:13

J Bohnen
University of Fort Hare

Abstract
The narrative account of Jesus’ unmasking of Judas as betrayer in John 13:26 and Matthew 26:23, displays a significant dissonance. In Matthew 26:23 Jesus indicates that ‘the one dipping his hand with me in the dish, will betray me’. In John 13:26 the same Jesus unmasks his betrayer as ‘the one to whom I give a morsel of bread that I shall dip in the dish’. How should this dissonance be interpreted? In this paper an intertextual reading of Matthew 26:23 and John 13:26 through the frame of table manners as presented in Sirach 31:12-32:13 is suggested. Using intertextuality as a dialogue between conceptual schemata or frames, I suggest that Judas, according to Matthew 26:23, betrays Jesus through ill-befitting table manners, but Jesus, acting in terms of befitting table manners, never betrays Jesus, according to John 13:26. A traditional banquet with its own etiquette (so Sirach) is given a new metaphorical quality – a quality of life and death, of abiding and defection.

1. Introduction
During the last twenty years or so, we have witnessed an almost ‘new quest’ for the Farewell narratives in the Gospel according to John1. Although it is not the intention of this article to catalogue and review the rich variety of scholarly contributions to John 13-17 (see Tolmie 1995: 1-13; Neugebauer 1995: 162-178; Klauck 1996; Moloney 1998a for extensive bibliographies), it is noticeable that the dominant focus is a move away from historical source- and redaction-oriented approaches (Onuki 1977) toward more literary discourse-oriented approaches (Howard-Brook 1994; Tolmie 1999; Neugebauer 1995; Rahner 2000; Moloney 1998a, 1998b; Sanford 1998). The view of a text, not as a self-contained structure but as differential inter-network, not structures of presence, but traces and tracings of other texts, has gained some2 support amongst New Testament scholars over the past decade. Engagement with biblical texts is thus much more than just (historical) description and explanation. The reader, considered as a semantic and semiotic position, plays a pivotal role in ‘enlarging’ and augmenting the text through an act of framing3. The nature of signification, written or otherwise, is dialogic in the sense that every textual utterance situates itself in a mutually responsive relation to other utterances, whether preceding it or anticipated. ‘All verbal interaction takes place in the form of an exchange of

3. Framing is used by cognitive psychologists to refer to a kind of mental template or cognitive structure (see Goffman 1974; Metzinger 1980). Some cognitive scientists refer to it as skeletal patterns of conceptual knowledge called ‘image schemata’ (cf. Turner 1991: 21, 57, 266). In narratology, framing refers to an embedded structure of stories within stories (see further Reid 1992; Gerrig 1993). Central to all framing is ‘negotiation’ and ‘dialogue’ between texts or parts thereof.
utterances, that is, in the form of a dialogue” (Bakhtin, quoted in Todorov 1984:52). When one reads with such an awareness, one is framing the exchange of utterances intertextually. Framing a text thus means that a reader applies a certain interpretive procedure. Reading is not a registration of textual ‘facts’, sources and traditions, but construing (Barthes would say ‘writing’) a relationship between a ‘host text’ and its ‘guest text’ or intertext.

In this article, my interest is not to pursue or access the fruits of studies pertaining to excavating archeological sources, distinguishing linear traditions behind John and Matthew4, or answer pertinent historical-literary questions (for a survey, see Schnackenburg 1982:7-15; Brown 1978:581-604; Dettwiller 1995:14-33). Nor do I intend to address the variety of fascinating narrative– (Tolmie, 1995 [detailed bibliography], 1999; Moloney 1998a; 1998b; Stibbe 1993, 1994; Culpepper 1998), socio-scientific– (Malina & Rohrbaugh 1998) and deconstructive (Buckley 1998) readings. My intention is limited to a suggestion for a possible way of making sense of Jesus’ two significantly dissonant exposures of Judas in Matthew 26:23 and John 13:26 against the meal-frame presented in Sirach 31. I suggest then, as one amongst many possible approaches, an interpretive possibility that John 13:26 be read alongside Matthew 26:23 within the conceptual frame of Sirach, 31:12-32:13. This will be done by means of an experimental reading for intertextuality5. My aim is to open a possible door and not to send my readers away with a closed, final interpretation. I will try to open such a door by firstly mentioning a two trailblazers toward an intertextual reading of John 13-17 with specific reference to John 13:21-30; secondly to briefly mention some operational aspects of intertextuality as reading strategy, and thirdly, to explore the possibility for making sense of John 13:26 from an intertextual perspective.

2. Two trailblazers

Since 1992, a number of scholars have proposed significant intertextual readings of a variety of Johannine texts and groups of texts (eg. Vorster 1992; Thyen 1992; Segovia 1992; Brawley 1993; Kurz 1997; Huie-Jolly’s 1997; Swancutt 1997; Deeley 1997). I will concentrate on two recent studies dealing specifically with intertextual readings of John 13.

Kitzberger’s (1994) study is significant in many ways. Although this is not the place to discuss her contribution in great detail, I would like to emphasise one or two aspects. In her reading of John 13:1-20 and Luke 7:36-50 she makes use of a reader-oriented intertextuality to contribute toward a feminist hermeneutic. Both the text and the reader (herself) are viewed as intertexts in dialogue with each other. Her approach comprises two aspects: firstly, intertextuality refers to a relationship between texts activated by a reader and not a property of texts per se. It is a reader who ‘opens up a text to an intertexts’ (1994:191). She makes a distinction between ‘intertext’ and ‘focused’ text. The intertext is the one opened up by the reader and the focused text is the text ‘in front of the reader’, so to

4. See the excellent contributions by Vorster 1989; Snyman 1996; Hatina 1999. I concur with Hillis Miller (1991:91) when he writes: ‘The relation between one text and its sources,’ like the relation among the elements in a single text, is an ambiguous interplay of sameness and difference,... Moreover, ‘sources’... are no more simple than their progeny. Like the ‘derived’ texts, the primary texts contain their own contradictory elements and have ambiguous relations to their own sources. They can therefore never serve as unequivocal principles of explanation for the meaning of the later texts they have engendered’. Leitch (1983:98), in his discussion of Riddell’s contribution to deconstruction, writes: ‘The resident earlier texts opens out the present text to an uncontrollable play of historical predecessors. The predecessor-texts themselves operate intertextually, meaning that no first, pure, or original text ever can or did rule over or delimit the historical oscillations at play in texts’.

5. ‘Reading for intertextuality’ means, reading for meaning-structures opened up in a text but not necessarily contiguous with a text (see further Silverman 1994:81).
speak. Secondly, intertextuality is a dialogue between written texts and the reader as text. ‘Reader as text’ refers to a reader as being situated within specific life-situations.

In John 13:1-20, Jesus’ footwashing evokes Mary’s anointing him, as narrated in John 12:1-8. However, there is an illogical sequence of action in Mary’s anointing: she anoints Jesus’ feet with costly oil and then dries his feet with her hair. Why anoint his feet and then dries it? The answer to this gap is implicated by opening up Luke 7:36-50. In this text, the woman, wets Jesus’ feet with her tears, dries them with her hair, kisses them and then anoints them with precious oil. Given this more logical sequence, Luke 7: 36-50 opens up a new horizon within which both texts, John 12:1-8 and John 13:1-20 are to be interpreted.

According to Kitzberger (1994:205): ‘Reading two texts intertextually, i.e., taking one text as the intertext of the other, results in a mutual interpretation. One text provides the key for understanding the other, and vice versa’. This is a noticeable difference with traditional source- and redactional studies, and should be pursued further by readers.

Convinced that traditional approaches (like historising, cut-and paste, symbolic) to address the apparent unevenness or aporia within 13-17 are not really satisfactorily, Dettwiller (1995) proposes an exegetical method called a ‘Relecture-Prozess’. This method, first developed by his promoter Zumstein⁶, holds that a later text consciously presupposes an earlier text. The later text is in actual fact an extension of the earlier one in the sense that such later text opens up new perspectives, only dormant in the earlier one. This method is thus building upon a ‘traditiongeschichtliche’ effort to ascertain the earliest tradition underlying the present text.

Building on earlier traditions, later texts provide new profiles and accents. The difference between historical tradition-criticism and ‘Relecture’ is that the latter is a hermeneutical strategy operating between texts within a specific narrative, like John, and not between John and extra-Johannine texts. In John 13-17 we thus find ‘Relecture’ between the micro- (13:31-14:31; 15:1-17; 15:18-16:4a; 16:4b-33; 17:1-26) and macro-structure of 13-17. For example, according to Dettwiller, John 15:1-17 is read as a recontextualising of John 13:1-17 and 13:34f. Similarly, 16:4b-33 is a rereading of 13:31-14:31.

In view of the two above mentioned studies, specifically related to John 13, it should be clear that scholars are not only willing to explore new ways of reading, but also to move beyond traditional historical questions. More and more, scholars are becoming interested in questions related to the function of texts absorbed into other texts. Linked to this is a conscious movement away from a preoccupation with sources used by an author. The focus is more on the role of the real reader in making sense of texts⁷.

3. What is intertextuality?

Intertextuality as concept and practice has become part of the literary furniture. ‘Currently, ‘intertextuality’ is a fashionable term, but almost everybody who uses it understands it somewhat differently’ (Plett 1991:3; cf. Mai 1991). In the light of the current

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6. See Zumstein 1996. From my reading Dettwiller differs from Zumstein in the sense that Zumstein, although he honours the various stages in the development of the Johannine community, does not presupposes a rigid development of traditions. Zumstein views ‘Relecture’ (from the French, ‘relecture’ and translated in German as ‘Rekontextualisierung’) as ‘wenn ein erster Text die Bildung eines zweitens Textes hervorruft und wenn dieser zweite Text seine volle Verständlichkeit erst im Bezug zum ersten Text gewinnt’ (1996:395). A clear example is found when the later First Letter of John is read as presupposing the Gospel of John. The prologue of 1 John gets its meaning and full profile if read in relation to the prologue of John’s Gospel.

7. See Segovia 1998b, 1999; Segovia & Tolbert 1995a, 1995b for an excellent mapping of shifts in exegetical approaches.
vogue, Miller (1985:19) suggests that we speak of intertextuality in the plural as intertextualities to cover the wide variety. However, Miller prefers to use the singular to indicate that, ‘although it is not a unified concept, its various forms enjoy what Wittgenstein would have called ‘family relationships’” (1985:19). My intention is not to entertain the reader with a historical overview of intertextuality, but to draw attention to a few proposals relevant for my reading of John 13:26 and Matthew 26:23. It is not my purpose to argue for a ‘right’ way of using the concept of intertextuality. Only that it would aid some clarity to specify the sense one is using it.

In order to make some progress, I propose that we distinguish between two broad forms of intertextuality:

3.1 Two broad forms of intertextuality
3.1.1 A textual-recall conception

It is generally agreed by literary theorists that the concept of intertextuality stems from Mikhail Bakhtin, a Russian linguist and literary theorist. Bakhtin’s dialogic approach to language places great emphasis on utterances in which two voices are meant to be interacting. He calls this phenomenon, ‘double voiced words’ or ‘words with a loophole’. Applied to text-analysis, it means that the position of an author, the task of a reader and the text should be reconsidered. The author must surrender his/her control and rather aspire to create several consciousnesses or voices which will be separate from his/her own. Thus, the author loses his/her ‘unique’ and ‘authentic’ voice. It merges with other voices. Every idea in a text ‘belongs to someone; it is situated with respect to a voice that expresses it and a horizon towards which it is directed. In place of the absolute we find a multiplicity of viewpoints, those of the characters and those of the author assimilated to them, and there are no privileged positions, no hierarchies’ (Todorov 1984:76). Other than monologic texts, polyphonic texts are ‘unfinalizable’, because dialogue is by definition, open. Another difference between monologic- and polyphonic texts is that the reader should not read for the plot, ‘but for the dialogues, and to read for the dialogues is to participate in them’ (Morson & Emerson 1990:240; cf. Morgan 1989). What is important in Bakhtin’s contribution is his view that texts do not talk to each other, people do because people uses signs but are never constrained by them. Granted, literary texts might provide the building blocks for dialogic activities, but only living consciousness can make it happen anew, and in new ways. Human intelligence is always more creative than anything that is imbedded in a text (Emerson 1996:111). The active reader thus becomes a pivotal partner in the dynamics of textual dialogics. Every text makes a reader aware of other texts.

3.1.2 Intertextuality as differential conception

Many theorists have extended Bakhtin’s theory, mainly French (eg. Kristeva, Barthes and Derrida) and American poststructuralists (eg. Hillis Miller, Hartman, Bloom). One aspect of poststructuralist reading that deserves further attention from readers of the Bible

8. For an extensive bibliography and highly informative biographical sketch, see Morson & Emerson 1994.
10. Intertextuality, as kind of rewriting and rewriting ‘can therefore be seen as rendering self-conscious (and sometimes simultaneous) the acts of writing and of reading, of collapsing these two, conventionally opposite, activities into a single process, of making the poet a reader and the reader a writer’ (Makin 1993:13).
as sacred text, is the notion of ‘excess’ (Derrida) or ‘surplus of meaning’ (Ricoeur). According to poststructuralist strategy or attitude, excess is produced within language. In Derridian terms (cf. Derrida 1981), if presence or meaning or signifiers of an absolute are perceptible only as a fabric of traces, the enunciation of that trace in language, and as language, proliferates in endless dissemination as a continuous supplement, ‘as a ‘more than,’ an excessiveness at work in shaping the reader herself’ (Phillips 1995:125). What Derrida is proposing, is what is generally referred to by literary scholars as intertextuality. Although he hardly uses this term, his views of language and iter-ability and supplement play a prominent role in theoretical discussions of intertextuality. In everything one says or writes, one always and necessarily uses words, words which also belong to others, mostly from nobody in particular, but certainly never from oneself alone. Speaking and writing is always a matter of following, repeating, adapting, recasting, displacing, prolonging and transformation what has already been said or written. Speaking and writing are acts of re-speaking and rewriting or inserting texts within some more or less network. There are always already other signifiers in a signifier. Therefore a text is constructed as a web of quotations, and a graft on to what has already been writing, to place a text upon, in or beside another text (Pasco 1994). ‘W]e could say that any text is inevitably quoting and quotable’ (Still & Wortin 1990:24). We could even consider calling it ‘textual ventriloquism’ (Maynard 1997; cf. also Singer 1989). Consequently, one reads a text intertextually as a function of that text’s differential relation to all existing and potential texts. Whereas the textual-recall model accentuates the reader as a constructive partner in the intertextual dynamics, the differential model emphasises the constructive (and deconstructive) power of language to create and erase endless traces of signifiers. Language precedes the subject. Hillis Miller (1991:198) writes: ‘It seems to me that the self is a function primarily of language rather than a preexistent given which uses language’. The reader, as subject, is a transposition generated by language and thus supplanted by the ongoing and endless play of language.

3.2 Production and/or Reception

Related, and to some extent a offspring of the above mentioned two conceptions is two well-known approaches to textual analysis, namely a production and/or a reception approach.

The first approach concentrates on a meticulous descriptive analysis (read registration) of source and influence relationships. This form of exegesis is essentially diachronic and operates in terms of a ‘unilinear causality’ (Frow 1990:46). Pivotal to the argument is relations of influence. The author, as agent and producer of texts, used other texts intentionally and to retrieve the intended meaning is to detect these sources of influence. From such a linear perspective, research on John 13 focuses on the origin of the material in John 13. At present only one of the many possible source hypotheses is in fact still receiving some attention, that of the so-called sign source (Fortna 1988; Von Wahlde 1989). The fact that it does not really relate to John 13, and that only a handful of scholars still cling to it is enough motivation for me that somehow scholars are moving away from such a unprofitable venture12. Although it is not the purpose of this article to discuss historical source-, tradition- and composition criticism, it suffices to say that these approaches take their starting point in what can me called a logic of linearity. An existing

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12. Van Belle (1994:375), in his comprehensive study on the history of source studies, provides the following telling assessment: ‘I am inclined to refuse the semeia hypothesis as a valid working hypothesis in the study of the Fourth Gospel’.
text with a fixed meaning and boundary is given in advance, and this function as the origin, model and centre, exercises influence and is imitated. Typical metaphors operating within the sphere of linearity are: genetic kinship, borrowing, growth, assimilation, inspiration, copying, etc. The purpose of source-influenced studies is to prove dependence, indebtedness of authors to other earlier texts, a definite line of continuity from an earlier text or tradition to a later text and above all, to verify authenticity. An author is imitating and emulating earlier text because the earliest text or tradition is viewed as the most authentic and true one. In a nutshell, 'Sources point to antiquity; antiquity points to authenticity' (Burge 1992:67). Exegesis becomes a horizontal process, namely a recording of the author's own textual network or that of his school or circle (cf. Johannine School). Van Wolde (1989:46) describes this process as one of 'indexicality'. The textual components are viewed as pointers toward causally earlier texts. In other words the author, working on a horizontal level, knew these earlier texts which means that the task of the exegete is to reconstruct this interchange between the author and contemporaneous texts.

A reader's approach to intertextuality stresses the constructive role of a reader in creating relationships between texts. As part of a 'compulsory reader response', Riffaterre (1990:56) provides me with a working definition when he defines an intertext as 'one or more texts which the reader must know in order to understand a work of literature in terms of its overall significance'. Clearly, the emphasis is not on knowledge pertaining to the production process or the temporal and casual principles that are used in combining signs in a linear pattern. The intertext is not a, necessarily causative source, but an act of interpretation by a reader. Causality is rejected 'in favour of an account of the work performed upon intertextual material and its functional integration in the later text' (Frow 1990:46). Van Wolde (1989:46) sees the signs as iconic signs, a term from Peirce that denotes the principle that signs are analogous or isomorphic. According to Peirce, (Aichele 1997:64-65), an icon exist only as an image in the mind. This again, reminds us of cognitive schemas or frames that are characterised by figurality and difference. That is, elements in a schema stand in tension with each other and extend each other simultaneously. Meaning is produced that goes beyond the meaning of the individual texts. For a reader's approach to intertextuality this means that the intertext, as a reader's construct, should resemble other signs (texts or fragments thereof), 'in some way' (Aichele 1997:63). On the other hand the differences between elements provides the driving force for interpretation. In terms of intertextuality, this means that a new figuration is formed.

In view of the above mentioned, my suggestion is that we read every text as situated within an intertextual web or interactional process; other texts are present in it, at variable levels, in more or less recognisable forms. Every text is thus a fabric woven out of other, including bygone and anonymous, conceptual schemata. Barthes (1983:235-236) calls it an 'image-repertoire' – a network of non-linear accumulated concepts, feelings, values and preferences. I believe a reader's appropriation of a text takes place in counterpoint to conceptual images that the reader construes as epistemically salient. However, texts, far from furnishing an undifferentiated epistemic field, offer a large but finite number of conceptual images and themes on which readers may focus. From this array, readers select a number significant to them and around these chosen ones further

13. I am well aware that my choice is for a textual-recall conception. However, this does not mean that a differential concept is excluded. I doubt whether it is possible to opt for either a text-recall of differential conception. In practice, so I imagine, the two would necessarily compliment each other.
14. Aichele (1997:152; see also 63ff) defines index as a term for signifiers that are connected in reality to their signifieds (for example, smoke as an index for fire), and icon as a term for signifiers that resemble their signifieds in some way (for example, maps, blueprints).
reflection takes place. This is, what I think, is the meaning of ‘‘intergesis’’ (Phillips & Aichele 1995).

Although there are many important differences between source-influenced studies and studies based on intertextuality, the main difference with regard to studying intertextual relationships between John and Matthew, is a different logic – a logic of supplement (a la Derrida’s view of iterability). The same text appears in another place without one being able to point somewhere to an original text. Since the text appears in another place, it is also never exactly the same (difference). However, complete difference would mean no relationship (however imagined), whatsoever. Therefore, for any relationship to be construed between texts, the reader should be in a position to detect some similarity or degree thereof.

3.3 Intertext and intertextuality

In paragraph 2.2, I have indicated that Riffaterre’s ‘definition’ of an intertext could be taken as a working definition. It is time now to unclothe his definition a little bit further. Riffaterre speaks in his definition about ‘knowing an intertext’. This could mean a mere awareness of some possible text somewhere or a specific text that comes to mind or that belongs to the cognitive scheme of the reader. Riffaterre is acutely aware of this ambiguity. Therefore, he distinguishes between ‘the actual knowledge of the form and content of that intertext, and a mere awareness that such an intertext exists and can eventually be found somewhere’ (Riffaterre 1990:56). This leads to a further distinction, namely between intertext and intertextuality. Intertextuality is ‘the web of functions that constitutes and regulates the relationship between text and intertext’. As was noticed by Kitzberger, intertext is the text ‘opened up’ by the reader. Is this readerly act a totally arbitrary one?

Riffaterre is very explicit in his answer to this question. ‘It seems to me that only specific, specialised signs can at once stand for the intertext, point to its locus, and uncover its identity’ (Riffaterre 1990:58). These specialised signs are words and phrases fulfilling a double role. On the one hand, signaling a difficulty – ‘an obscure or incomplete utterance in the text’ (that can only be answered by an intertext), and on the other hand, ‘pointing the way to where the solution must be sought’. Thus, words and phrases are both the problem (seen from the perspective of the text) and the solution (as suggested by the intertext).

Furthermore, words and phrases

\textit{belong equally in text and intertext, linking the two, and signalling (sic!) in each the presence of their mutually complementary traits. Accordingly, I shall call them connectives. And in addition to identifying them, ... the connectives combine the sign system of text and intertext into new semiotic clusters, thereby freeing the text from its dependency on usage and existing conventions, and subordinating its descriptive and narrative devices to a signifying strategy unique to the text} (Riffaterre 1990:58)\textsuperscript{15}.

3.4 When is intertextuality?

For effective intertextual reading, Plett (1991:5) suggests that we try to find an answer to the following question: ‘Which markers signalize an intertext?’ A number of Biblical scholars have proposed possible markers and procedures for constructing intertexts.

\textsuperscript{15} See also Miller (1985:30) for a lucid description of Riffaterre’s distinction between ‘aleatory’ and ‘obligatory’ intertextuality. ‘Aleatory’ intertextuality is defined as ‘the connection which a reader establishes between a focused text and a totally free, unrestricted range of other texts’. ‘Obligatory’ intertextuality, ... imposes several important constraints on the connections the reader makes in his choice of intertexts and in his choice of relational procedures’.
Köhler (1987:16-24) suggests the following criteria for identifying intertextual relationships: direct quotation, allusion, taking over formulations and contents, positive incorporation of content; negative incorporation of contents. Richard Hays (1989:29-32) proposes seven criteria for identifying intertextual echoes: availability, volume, recurrence, thematic coherence, historical plausibility, history of interpretation, and satisfaction. Segovia (1992:356), following Robert Alter, distinguishes five signals: actual citation of the evoked text, a deliberate recasting or distorting of a cited text, use of a single word from the evoked text, use of a name or motif, use of a situation without any verbal borrowing, direct or veiled, from the evoked text.

Most recently, Van Wolde (1997:7) has proposed six very useful markers for intertextuality: 1) repetition of words and semantic fields; 2) repetitions of larger textual units or structures; 3) similarities in theme or genre; 4) analogies in character descriptions or character types; 5) similarities in actions or series of actions; and 6) similar narratological representations – that is the ways in which a narrator represents the actions of characters. According to Van Wolde (1997:8) ‘if sufficient repetition does not exist, there is no basis for arguing for intertextuality.

In the analysis that follows, I will limit myself to Van Wolde’s first, third and fifth categories and group them together as two sets of criteria, namely, paradigmatic textual categories and socio-cultural categories. What I mean by paradigmatic textual categories entails equivalent semantic fields of meaning and themes. Socio-cultural categories refer to modes of understanding and cultural coding (eg. how people living within a Mediterranean symbolic universe eat – their norms and table manners).

4. Reading John 13:26, Matthew 26:23 and Sirach 31 intertextually

John 13:21-30 and Matthew 26:20-25 are extremely rich and loaded pericopes that leave the reader full to bursting and at the same time with some unease feeling of constipation – a dish with food and hands rich in potential!

4.1 What is the problem?

Various interpretive problems have been identified (see Schnackenburg 1982:7-15): is Jesus instituting the eucharist; what exactly is the nature of the morsel of bread; what is the role of Satan, the motivation of Judas, and, is the account of Jesus actions historically reliable and credible?

However, it is interesting to note that Jesus’ actual method of exposing Judas in John is markedly different to the method, narrated in Matthew. In John 13:21 Jesus, distressed and probably disturbed, announces: ‘I tell you solemnly, one of you will betray me.’ Who

16. From another perspective, Vernon Robbins (1992:313), through his proposal for a socio-rhetorical criticism (cf. Combrink 1999; Gowler 1994), challenges the reader to broaden intertextual boundaries to include the Mediterranean symbolic universe (customs, behaviors and attitudes) in which early Christians, as the authorial audience lived. As a way to refine these broadened symbolic values, Robbins (1996:2) suggests a differentiation between oral-scribal (use of language) intertexture, social intertexture, cultural intertexture and historical intertexture. For my specific purpose it is vital to unpack social- and cultural intertexture a little bit further. According to Robbins, social intertexture pertains to features like clothes people wear, the organic configuration of families and households, political groupings, military operations, and distribution of food, money and services. Cultural intertexture concerns modes of understanding and belief systems, like how people view themselves – their importance, opportunities and responsibilities. For the purpose of this paper, I combine social and cultural intertextuality as socio-cultural intertextuality.

17. For the purpose of this article, I note the similarities and differences between John, Mark, Luke and Matthew, but will not discuss it further.

18 Translations are taken from The Jerusalem Bible 1968. London: Darton, Longman & Todd.
will this be? Jesus clearly indicates the action that will expose his betrayer: ‘It is the one to whom I give the small piece of bread which I am going to dip in the dish’ (Ἐκεῖνος ἔστιν τῷ ἐγώ βασιλεύ τῷ φωσίου καὶ δύστον αὐτῷ). In Matthew 26:21 Jesus announces: ‘I tell you solemnly, one of you is about to betray me’. Who will this be? Jesus responds by indicating the action or deed that will expose the betrayer: ‘The one dipping his hand with me in the dish, will betray me’ (Ὁ ἐμβαφαῖς μετ’ ἐμοῦ τὴν χεῖρα ἐν τῷ τρυβλίῳ χυτός με παραδώσει). Clearly, the reader becomes confused and puzzled because the two methods of exposure differ radically. On the one hand, Matthew states that someone will put his hand with Jesus in the dish. On the other hand, John states that Jesus will take a piece of bread and then gives it to someone. The purpose is similar (exposing a betrayer), but the methodological action differs to such an extent that it seems as if Matthew and John are narrating two distinct events, which is not the case! Hence, a clear example of differing but equivalent or in Derridean terms, identity in difference – identical at the level of narrative situation (eating a meal together and announcing a betrayer), but different at the level of the way of exposing the betrayer. Consequently, the reader is left with obscurity, undecidability and indeterminacy.

From some perspective, viewing the implied authors of Matthew and John as eyewitnesses, one could conclude that, if they were narrating the same event, one of them should be judged a liar. How can two persons, sitting at the same table, observing the same event, report the happenings during the meal in such radically different and contradicting ways? The reader could tolerate minor detail differences, but radical differences like these, is historically bewildered. From another perspective, the reader could tolerate differences like these because there is a possibility that Matthew and John could have used different oral and written sources and traditions in constructing their narratives. At least, such a possibility could pardon them being unreliable reporters – they did not lie, but the originators of their sources did!

Given the undecidability and indeterminacy, I propose that we regard the discrepancy as a deictic gap or a space of ungrammaticality, as Riffaterre (1990:57) calls it. According to him, a reader perceives that something is missing from the text and needs to be retracted and filled. What is needed is ‘references to an as yet unknown referent, references whose successive occurrences map out, as it were, the outline of the intertext still to be discovered’. The reader should start looking for latent references in latent intertexts. Gaps or narratival ungrammaticality within the text alerts the reader to seek for grammaticality somewhere else (‘any ungrammaticality within the poem is a sign of grammaticality elsewhere, that is, of belonging in another system’ [Riffaterre 1978:164-165]). As Kitzberger (1994:195) has shown, gaps have a communicative attention function: ‘it directs the reader’s attention to something outside the text, to another text, in order to fill this gap and to establish intertextuality’. This ‘somewhere else’ and ‘something outside’, so my suggestion goes, is the set of table manners spelled out in Sirach 31.

19. The use of ‘Matthew’ and ‘John’ do not indicate that I regard them as historical authors of the Gospel of Matthew and the Gospel of John respectively. Whenever ‘Matthew’ and ‘John’ are used, it refers to the canonical Gospels.

20. Care must be taken when the concept ‘reference’ is used. Obviously it is not reference in a mimetic sense, but reference as trace of other signifiers, trace as part of an inter—signification process (cf. Miller 1985:31). Riffaterre shares the danger of the so called ‘referential fallacy’ and renounces ‘the firm belief of language users in nonverbal reference, their assumption that words mean by referring to a reality without the pale of language, to objects that exist in themselves before they become signs’. Instead, he is of the opinion that a ‘text refers not to objects outside of itself, but to an intertext. The words of the text signify not by referring to things, but by presupposing other texts’ (Riffaterre 1981:227-228).
In what sense are Wisdom sayings, particularly Sirach 31:12-32:13, relevant for my reading? A remarkable feature of wisdom literature is the involvement of various literary types: practical wisdom, speculative or philosophical wisdom, gnomic prose wisdom, dramatic dialogical wisdom to name a few. Without elaborating the issue of wisdom as text type (cf. Williams 1981, 1987), I view such a variety or mixture of genres as human formulations or conceptual frameworks stipulating the codes that regulate the world of nature and human affairs. Mesters refers to wisdom, specifically Sirach, as ‘Die Weisheit des Volkes’ and as such provides signposts for their journey with God (Mesters 1983:36). These codes (‘gute Umgangsformen’, Mesters 1983:57) are assumed to have been instituted by God, ‘but the precise character of God himself is rarely spelled out; it is simply assumed to be enunciated elsewhere’ (Reed 1993:61 emphasis added). Again, in terms of my reading proposal, Matthew and John are two examples of this elsewhere. The codes of Sirach find its embodiment in a new narrative economy in John and Matthew. Sirach becomes a new frame within which both Matthew 26:23 and John 13:26 can be interpreted.21

4.2 Reading Sirach 31:12-32:13

Chapter 31 deals with proper manners and moderation in eating. In general, the advice given here is ‘what is dictated by good manners and courtesy’ (Di Lella & Skehan 1987:388). Various befitting table manners are given in Sirach 31:12-32:13 for both guests and the host.

When one is a guest at a banquet of the great (τραπέζης μεγάλης), it is expected not to act in a greedy manner because greediness is a sign of bad manners. Sirach’s advice is to act in a respectable manner. Guests should honour their host as well as each other. If there are many other guests you should not be the first to reach for the food (Sirach 31:18). Also, one should be sensitive to the host and other guests, they have feelings (Sirach 31:15a). If the host or one of the guests eyes a particular piece of food and reaches for it, do not reach for it at the same time (Sirach 31:14 – ὅ τι εἶναι ἐπιβλέψι μὴ ἐκτελεῖ καὶ μὴ συμφλέβων αὐτῷ ἐντρυφλῖλιν). If a guest does put his/her hand with that of the host or any other guest, it is seen as bad manners and a sign of disrespect and disloyalty. More so, it is a way of communicating a definite message: ‘I do not care for you, I do not have time for you anymore, I am through with you and actually write you off!’ Acting like a glutton, the guest is despoiling the integrity of the host. If two hands reach out for the same dish, the guest is expected to be the first to stop, as befits good manners. In doing this the message is clear: ‘I respect you and therefore, please proceed, help yourself first’!

21. Does this mean that Matthew and John knew Sirach? Without elaborating, I would respond, I do not know and it is not really relevant for my intertextual reading. Intertextuality is my creative construction. Many scholarly readers have proposed a wisdom influence in John’s Gospel. Augstinius, in his First tractate on the Gospel of John, is of the opinion that Logos as wisdom is not restricted to the prologue, but is called to mind in the motif of Jesus offering food and drink as symbols of instruction. Scott (1992) has done a thorough study of wisdom and Christology in John’s Gospel and suggests that a rich developed Sophia-Christology is presented in John. Sophia is an essential key to the Gospel. Reed (1993:93-97) demonstrates that the ‘sapientializing process’ in John is not restricted to the prologue, but is also evident in the numerous discourses of Jesus. Ringe (1999) sees the heart of John as a model of accompaniment that is revealed paradigmatically in Jesus’ life as it embodies dimensions of wisdom and friendship. (see further McKinlay 1996). For wisdom in Matthew, see Suggs 1970; Burnett 1981; Deutsch 1987, 1990.

The host should be equally sensitive toward his guests. He should be modest in his performance. An outstanding responsibility of a worthy host, presiding at a banquet, is to take care of his guests first. Their needs should be given preference (Sirach 32:1). Only after he has attended to the needs of the guests, should he take his place and help himself. The performance of the host reveals a certain attitude. If he is modest and caring in his act, it is a sign of respect for his guests. In other words ‘I serve you first because I value you greatly; you are important to me. Therefore, I treat you with honor’.

4.3 Reading John 13:26

Although Jesus is depicted in a rich variety of functions and metaphors in the Gospel according to John, one could, though being aware of reductionism, characterised Jesus’ life as a service to the Father and the community. In Johannine language, Jesus has come to make his Father known (John 1:18) so that the world may have eternal life, so that through Jesus’ revelation the world might be saved (John 3:16-17). These two aspects are closely interlinked and to some extent interdependent. Jesus’ service to mankind (the world), is founded and fueled by his close relationship with his Father. In Jesus’ witness and service, the quality of his relationship with his Father is disclosed – intimacy and operationality form a reciprocal loop (8:28-29; 10:18). Although inseparable, intimacy has an archetypal dimension that is theologically prior to the operational. In John 13, we find a lucid example of such a reciprocal loop. In chapter 13, we find an explicit extension of the loop-model; Jesus’ service is given as a model to be imitated (John 13:15). Jesus’ sincere relationship with his Father and perfect love for his own create a centrifugal network that should be manifested in the life of his own disciples. The key issue, however is: After Jesus had washed the feet of the disciples, he asked them: ‘Do you understand what I have done to you’. Do they understand that Jesus’ intimacy and service form a reciprocal loop?

Jesus’ devoting relationship with his own is now played out most distinctly through his words and actions during the last evening that he spends with them. In John 13:1-38 we read about two events with commentary and discussion thereon, which compliments and enriches each other – Jesus washing his disciple’s feet and the unmasking of Jesus’ betrayal. I will concentrate on the latter.

Jesus and his disciples were at a banquet (δείπνον, cf. Louw & Nida 1988:252). Although the text is not specific on the spatial position of Judas, we can infer that Judas was reclining near to Jesus, probably next to him. Some scholars put Judas on Jesus’ left side so that his head was near Jesus’ breast. The Beloved Disciple was on Jesus’ right hand side. The place on the left of the host is generally regarded as a place of honour. It is usually kept for an intimate friend (cf. Smith, R H 1989). If this is to be the case, and if Judas was indeed sitting on the left-hand side of Jesus, the host, then Judas had occupied a place of honour.

After the footwashing event, John 13:21 now takes the narrative into a dramatic ‘moment of truth’ stage. Throughout chapter 13, the reader has been given direct and indirect hints that the narrative is moving toward a moment of truth. With distress (‘troubled in spirit’, cf. 11:33; 12:27) and more boldness,24 Jesus now solemnly declares25:

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23. I interpret the so-called ascend-descend schemata in John as an integral part of the metaphorical journey of Jesus in John. A pivotal aspect of the journey is the intimate relationship between Jesus and his Father. In the context of John 13 Jesus’ return to his Father is an authentication of his origin, namely from above.

24. Why is Jesus distressed or ‘greatly grieved’ as Filson (1960:273) translates ἐξαπατώμενος? His reply: Because Jesus is to be betrayed? Or because one of them will do it? Probably both; the latter seems their main concern.

25. Lindars (1977:457) sees Jesus declaration as a form of witness or even accusation, like in a court of law.
I tell you, one of you will betray me’. In John 13:10 Jesus alludes to somebody who would betray him, somebody who, after being washed by Jesus, was still not clean. In John 13:18 we find another allusion to betrayal by means of a quotation of Psalm 41:9. The moment for the traitor to act has arrived.

The irony is that the disciples, being so close to Jesus, are none the wiser about what is to happen. Jesus’ bold words also have a disturbing effect upon the disciples. They are perplexed and uncertain of whom he spoke. The confusion and lack of insight that started with Peter in John 13:6-9 and surfaced again in John 13:12-13 is heading for a climactic soul-search – Who will betray Jesus? Each of the disciples is wondering about the others and about himself. The fact that the disciples do not know who the betrayer is, is not insignificant. Culpepper (1998:201; 1991:132) is of the opinion that knowledge and ignorance as a variation on the conflict between belief and unbelief is a recurring theme in John 13. Recognition is possible, but not achieved. ‘The chapter reports what Jesus knew and the actions following from that knowledge. The disciples, especially Peter and Judas, do not share Jesus’ knowledge, and their ignorance leads to denial and betrayal’. What is the nature of Jesus’ knowledge? According to Howard-Brook (1994:302-303), it equals intimacy and ‘oneness’. This kind of knowledge is characteristic of Jesus knowledge that he has of his own fate as well as Judas’ fate. He has chosen Judas and has an involved knowledge of him. Ironically, the disciples, Jesus own, do not know each other at all (cf. John 13:28).

Again, Peter is the first one to act. Rather than revealing his ignorance, he prefers do act in an indirect way. He beckoned to the Beloved Disciple, leaning on Jesus’ breast, that he should ask who it should be of whom Jesus spoke. In stead of answering the Beloved Disciple’s question directly by naming the culprit, Jesus opts for an alternative, symbolic method of exposing the betrayer. What is the method of unmasking? Jesus informs the disciples that ‘It is the one to whom I give the piece of bread that I shall dip in the dish’ (John 13:26a - Ἐκείνος ἔστη ὦ ἐγὼ βάψω τὸ φωμίον καὶ δώσω αὐτῷ). This is followed by a demonstration ‘He [Jesus] dipped the morsel of bread and gave it to Judas Iscariot’ (John 13:26b - βαφαὶ σὺν τὸ φωμῖον [λαμβάνει καὶ δίδωσιν Ἰούδα Σίμωνος Ἰσκαριώτου], and then, ‘at that instant, Satan entered him’ (John 13:27 - καὶ μετὰ τὸ φωμῖον τότε εἰσῆλθεν εἰς ἐκείνου ὁ Σατάνας). It is an ironic ‘baptism,’ for Jesus’ act of dipping will lead the recipient to be entered by Satan, not God’ (Howard-Brook 1994:304). Jesus dips (13:26b - βαφαί) the bread and through the act of baptism the bread is purified, is made clean. In other words, Jesus gives Judas a baptised piece of bread, his own body, himself as the bread (John 6:35). But, instead of cleaning and purifying Judas, the bread contaminates and poisons him. Instead of changing, Judas became diseased, sick with Satan having entered him! Thus, intimacy with Jesus devolves to rejection! Jesus’ gift to Judas becomes a Satanic poison! More important for my intertextual reading, Judas’ question to the elders and chief priests in Matthew 26:15 – ‘What will you

26. I will not pursue the very interesting discourse pertaining to the relationship between Judas and Satan here. Suffice to say that it is a highly complex issue. Is Jesus’ action preparing the way for the action of Satan. In other words, should we understand the relationship in casual terms? My own understanding tends to move in a different direction. In stead of a casual relationship, I think we should think theologically. From a casual perspective, the question is ‘does Satan enters Judas as a consequence of Judas taking the bread from Jesus?’ From a teleological perspective the question is: ‘does Satan enters Judas so that Judas can take the bread?’

27. Obviously, cryptic deconstructive remarks like these should be pursued more thoroughly. Suffice to say that ‘Gift’ and ‘poison’ are used in a Derridian sense of φαρμάκον (cure and poison). For an alternative deconstructive reading, see Buckley 1998.
give me … if I hand him [Jesus] over to you’ – is answered by Jesus in John 13:23 – Jesus gave Judas life sustaining, baptised in love, bread, himself!

What is happening here? The choice of a deed rather than a word, and the nature of the deed itself is highly significant. Judas’ identity as betrayer is accomplished with a piece of bread, with good table manners! This is where Sirach 32:1-2, as intertext is evoked.

As usual there is a mixture of differences and similarities. As was mentioned above, the idea is not to find exact similarities, but paradigmatic traces and condensations. In terms of these paradigmatic traces and condensations, the reader constructs an intertext opened up by the two focused texts.

In terms of paradigmatic textual categories (equivalent semantic fields and themes) the following is noteworthy:

‘If you are chosen to preside at dinner … take care of them [the guests] first before you sit down – (Sirach 32:1) see to their needs, then take your place’ (Sirach 32:2)

and equivalent interrelations

They are at a banquet (John 13:2) … [and by implication] Jesus, their Master, Lord and host is presiding (John 13:4, 13) … the one to whom I shall give the morsel of bread after I have dipped it in the dish’ (John 13:26)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Setting:</strong> During a banquet (John 13:2, Jesus and his disciples were at a banquet</td>
<td><strong>Setting:</strong> During a banquet (Sirach 31:12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Semantic field:</strong> Jesus is host and presiding</td>
<td><strong>Semantic field:</strong> Host is presiding (Sirach 32:1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesus takes a morsel of bread first, and gives it to Judas, an honoured guest at the table (13:26)</td>
<td>Take care of the guest first (Sirach 32:1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theme:</strong> Jesus values guest highly. Jesus respects Judas.</td>
<td>See to their needs first (Sirach 32:2)</td>
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<td><strong>Theme:</strong> Guests are of value. Respect for guest.</td>
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Although, semantic fields are not always specific, it should be clear that semantic values and themes are adequately equivalent in both John 13:1-30 and Sirach 31:1, 32:1-2.

Socio-cultural codes are more prominent in John 13 and Sirach 31:1, 32:1-2. According to Di Lella & Skehan (1987:391), socio-cultural values and attitudes expressed in Sirach 31:1-32:13 were commonly shared by cultivated Jews. I would like to add that similar values and attitudes were also commonly shared by Early Christians.

Banquets are regarded not only as nourishment, but also as a mode of communicating mutual solidarity, oneness and belonging-ness. Furthermore, it also indicates the transformation of a stranger into a guest (Carson 1991:474; Malina & Rohrbaugh 1998:71; cf. Bolyki 1998; Pohl 1999). As befits courtesy and moderation, the host, as the one presiding at a banquet table, should take care of his guests first, should see to their needs first. If the host honours the integrity of his guests and respect them as his own intimate friends, he would attend to them first. He takes initiative to serve his guests because he
loves them. ‘What John describes is a basic gesture of Oriental hospitality ... Indeed, Jesus may be extending to Judas a special act of esteem whereby a host singles out a guest whom he wishes to honor and picks out for him from the common plate a choice morsel of food’ (Brown 1978:578). Now, it is clear that although Judas’ intention was to betray Jesus, Jesus is not prepared to betray Judas. Judas abandons Jesus, but Jesus does not abandon him. Judas is a defector, Jesus a sincere soul-friend. Jesus still loves Judas and he treats him as his guest, as his companion, and his carefully selected own! He respects Judas to such an extent that he is willing to hand him a morsel of himself, the bread that gives life (John 6:35). Jesus, through the act of handing Judas bread, is giving him the most costly gift, the gift of life!

What is Judas’ response? Judas does not refuse the morsel! On the contrary, ‘after Judas had taken the bread, Satan entered him’ (13:27 [The Jerusalem Bible], 30)! Filled with the ‘Satanic sacrament’ (Wrede), Jesus now realises that the moment of truth is at hand. Judas has reached the point of no return28. Judas has no further place at the table of life. Therefore, Jesus orders Judas: ‘What you are going to do, do quickly’ (13:27). Convinced that Judas is not prepared to honour Jesus’ hospitality and having disclosed his disrespect for good manners, Judas must leave, without delay. It is interesting to note Sirach’s advice: ‘When it is time to leave, tarry not; be off for home without delay’ (32:11). ‘Overstaying your welcome is a gross violation of good manners’ (Di Lella & Skehan 1987:392). It is almost as if Jesus is saying to Judas: ‘You have treated my gesture of love and honour with contempt. So, before you violate any good manners further, go away quickly!’ This is not all. There is also a positive role to Judas’ departure. Jesus is actually directing his own betrayal by hastening (τὴν ἑρμηνείαν τοῦ αἰματοκύτταρου) the arrival of the betrayal (Carson 1991:475). Judas, and in some sense Peter as well, is actually enhancing the christological perspective of John – Jesus’ death is part of his mission.

What is the disciples’ response? None of the disciples understood Jesus’ action. Jesus acted in such a subtle way that they did not even notice the unmasking and exposure of Judas as the one who is to betray Jesus. They thought that Jesus instructed Judas to go and buy what was needed for the festival. Thus, the disciples ‘have been reduced to caricatures, comic book figures who don’t know which end is up. Whether we attribute this confusion to their being distraught at the news of an internal betrayer or simply the gospel’s need to contrast Jesus with his followers in extreme terms, their misunderstanding of what is happening in their midst makes us not sure whether to laugh or to cry’ (Howard-Brook 1994:305).

The focus in narrating the betrayal-event is not so much on the act of Judas but the action of Jesus. Judas is not the main actor29, but the recipient of Jesus’ love-action. Judas never speaks during the meal; he hardly acts. He only receives the gift of bread. Jesus, on the other hand is the one taking initiative to speak and act. He is the giver and Judas the receiver.

At the beginning of this paragraph, I suggested that John 13 is taking us to a moment of truth. John closes the scene that confirms this by a dramatic closing: ‘And it was night’ (13:30a). Jesus, who came to his own people, as a witness to speak for the light, is rejected by one of his own because darkness has embodied one of his own. Hidden behind Judas since John 6, Satan is now inside him. ‘Whereas Jesus leaves, as he enters, divine (and triumphant), the Devil enters demonic and fades away (he is not even favoured with an exit scene) as a flawed human being ... ’ (Eslinger 2000:69).

29. From a semiotic perspective, Genyut (1982), deems Judas to be a minor character.
4.4 Reading Matthew 26:23


According to Powell (1992:199; I make extensive use of his contribution), Matthew has a main plot and two subplots. The main plot is 'God’s plan and Satan’s challenge'. Although the story is clearly about the main character, Jesus, the real norm as presented in Matthew is God's solidarity with us. At its deepest level, Matthew is a story about God. God is pleased with Jesus (Matthew 3:17) and, through Jesus, God intends to save people from sin (Matthew 1:21) but, in this process Satan intends to counter God’s plan. However, the conflict is not presented as God vs Satan per se but 'it is God at work in Jesus’ who is opposed to Satan (cf. 13:36-43)' (Powell 1992:198).

The first subplot is Jesus and the religious leaders and the second subplot is Jesus and the disciples. The role of the disciples is twofold. They assist God in His accomplishment of his program of forgiveness. They themselves are sinners who are called by Jesus into a new community that will do the will of God (9:13; 12:49-50). As forgiven sinners, they became co-workers of Jesus in pursuing and bringing about the fulfillment of God’s program of forgiveness for 'his people' as ‘the many’ (Matthew 20:28). They are called to be fishers of men; mandated to cast out unclean spirits and to heal the sick. After the narrator announced that Jesus is 'destined to go to Jerusalem and suffer grievously at the hands of the elders and chief priests and scribes, to be put to death' (Matthew 16:21), the disciples became a hindrance to the accomplishment of God’s program. In addition to the first part of God’s plan of forgiveness of sins, is Jesus’ giving up his life as ransom. It is this last part that the disciples challenge and hinder. This hindrance is 'explicitly attributed to Satan. Just as Satan previously utilized the religious leaders in an attempt to thwart Jesus’ ministry of calling sinners, now Satan works through the disciples in an attempt to prevent Jesus from giving his life as ransom’ (Powell 1992:203).

In Matthew 26, the reader is faced with the climax of opposition (Combrink 1991:10). Jesus' somber statement in Matthew 26:23 is part of his last night with the twelve. The mood is gloomy because one of Jesus’ disciples is going to hand him over (παραδίδωμι). Who will it be?

In 26:2 Jesus hints that the Son of Man will be handed over to be crucified. Even before the real contract between Judas and the chief priests (26:14-16), in which Judas actually made himself vulnerable, Jesus was already fully cognisant of the one who will betray him, the one who will let him down. What will be the sign given by Jesus to unmask the betrayer?

30. παραδίδωμι - Klassen (1996:202, cf. also 1999). One aspect that is not accounted for enough in Klassen’s argument is the negative nuance of this term in the New Testament (cf. Gosling 1999). The reason why Klassen is not sensitive enough to this aspect is presumably his view of the semantic value of words. Klassen examines the meaning of παραδίδωμι in terms of four lexicographical areas: Classical Greek, LXX, Josephus and the New Testament. He is more interested in the historical development than in the contextual use of a specific word. Meaning is assigned to a word within a specific domain or ‘language game’ (Wittgenstein). Newer semantics has taught us that words do not have meaning, but obtain meaning in its use. Therefore, I would like to concur with Louw & Nida (1988:485, paragraph 37.111 – 37.113): ‘to deliver a person into the control of someone else, involving either the handing over of a presumably guilty person for punishment by authorities or the handing over of an individual to an enemy who will presumably take undue advantage of the victim – ‘to hand over, to turn over, to betray’. I use ‘betray’ and ‘hand over’ as semantic equivalent concepts.

31. Verse 15 is a direct confirmation of Jesus’ proleptic announcement in 26:2. Judas will hand him over (παραδίδωμι). Heil (1991:29) comments: ‘The necessity for Jesus to be ‘delivered’ or ‘betrayed’... to the ‘chief priests’ (16:21; 20:18) and other Jewish authorities in order to be put to death in accord with God’s salvific plan, as repeatedly predicted by Jesus, is now being fulfilled. The reader can thus be assured that
When evening came, that first day of the Unleavened Bread, commemorating the liberation from slavery, Jesus reclined with the twelve. Then, almost as a false cord, Jesus boldly announces: 'I tell you solemnly, one of you is about to betray me' (26:21). For Judas, who obviously was present at the meal, it must have come as a shock – somebody knows my secret! Who will that be? How will they know? How will I be unmasked? And then comes the answer. Not by a public announcement but through a symbolic act of bad table manners. Judas’ action around the dish and his hasty hand will reveal the betrayer.

As an answer to the question of the distressed disciples (Matthew 26:22), Jesus answered: ‘The one dipping his hand with mine in the dish, will betray me’ (Matthew 26:23 - 'Ο ἐμὴ κεφαλή μετ' έμοι την χείρα εν τῷ τρυπαλίῳ οὗτος με παραδώσει ). Judas will betray Jesus by putting his hand with Jesus’ in the dish. How should we understand this seemingly innocent act? Sirach 31:12-17 could provide a possible answer.

Semantic equivalence is more specific in Matthew 26:23 and Sirach 31:12-18 than in John 13:26 and Sirach 32:1-2. Again, the objective is not to find sameness, but to construct an intertext to facilitate an intertextual reading.

The following semantic fields and themes are relevant:

‘Are you seated at a banquet table? (Sirach 31:12) ... Toward what he is looking at, do not put out a hand; nor reach when he does, for the same dish (Sirach 31:14). ... Be the first to stop, as befits good manners; (Sirach 31:17) ... If there are many with you at table, be not the first to reach out your hand. (Sirach 31:18)’.

_and equivalent interrelations_

‘Jesus is with his disciples, eating (Matthew 26:20,21), ... The one dipping his hand with mine in the dish, will betray me’ (Matthew:26:23).

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<tr>
<th>MATTHEW 26:20-25</th>
<th>SIRACH 31:12-17</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Setting:</strong> Jesus and his disciples were eating (Passover) (26:20)</td>
<td><strong>Setting:</strong> Eating together at a banquet (31:12), at table (31:12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Semantic fields:</strong> His hand (26:23) with me (26:23) dipping (26:23) in the same dish (26:23)</td>
<td><strong>Semantic fields:</strong> Hand (31:14, 18) for the same dish (31:14) reach when he does (31:14) first to reach out your hand (31:18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theme:</strong> Betrayal Rejection Disrespect</td>
<td><strong>Theme:</strong> Disrespect Bad manners Rejection</td>
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although it is a tragic betrayal, Judas’s wicked scheme against Jesus is embraced within God’s program of salvation”.

32. An alternative term for Passover. On the tasks and procedures to be performed during the Passover, see Smith, R H 1989:304). Harrington (1991:269) discusses the essential features of the Passover celebrations (see also Saladin 1984).

33. Although there is no mentioning of a table, I am using the idiomatic expression, together around the table, meaning, eating together. Traditionally, Jews sat at tables for ordinary meals. On festive occasions it was customary to recline on cushions
Socio-cultural equivalent codes are equally prominent in both texts. At a critical moment during the meal, Jesus reached out to dip the morsel of bread in the dish. At the same time, Judas also reached out for the dish. In terms of a set of shared table manners, as depicted by Sirach, Judas was supposed to pull back his hand as befits good manners. He was supposed not to put out his hand but wait for the host to serve him. But Judas does not comply with proper table manners. By proceeding to put his hand with Jesus’ hand in the dish, Judas is saying to Jesus: ‘I am not prepared to wait my turn!’ Furthermore, he ‘denied leadership to Jesus and revealed himself a rebel’ (Fensham 1964/65: 261).

Through a bold symbolic deed of putting his hand together with Jesus’ in the dish Judas is communicating a zealous derogatory message: ‘Jesus, I am through with you; I do not respect you anymore; I do not have time for you anymore (cf. Jesus’ confirming the nearness of the time [26:18]); I do not trust you any more’!

Judas’ symbolic decry is followed by a hypocritical, almost naïve question: ‘Not I, Rabbi,’ surely?’ (John 26:25). Judas attempts a last trick to conceal his identity. But, Jesus sees through Judas’ game. Judas has actually answered his own question in the symbolic deed of putting his hand with Jesus’ in the dish. Judas answers his own question by means of the way he behaved at the table.

In terms of the Mediterranean symbolic universe, Judas not only violates the bond between those who eat together, but also the bond among those who celebrate Passover as a ‘meal of friendship’, as a space for renunciation of hostile attitudes (Filson 1960:274). Indeed, what an irony? Eating together was supposed to be an act of reconciliation, but Judas’ deed, transforms it into an act of rejection!

Thus Judas betrayed Jesus and doing so unmasks himself through his own actions and words. Judas’ handing over recoiled on his own head (cf. Sirach 21:27). The main actor in the scene is thus Judas. He takes initiative and acts as a pacesetter in the story.

5. Eating together

It is noticeable that eating together forms a strong link between John 12 and 13. Six days before the Passover, Jesus went to Bethany, where Lazarus was, whom he had raised from the dead, they gave a dinner (σέρανον) for him there (John 12:2). Again, this time in Jerusalem, Jesus and his disciples were at supper (σέρανον) (John 13:2). Add to this the narrator’s comment in John 11:5-6 (‘Jesus loved Martha and her sister, and Lazarus, yet when he heard that Lazarus was ill he stayed where he was for two more days’), we could infer that Jesus enjoyed some form of eating together whilst he stayed with Martha and her sister. More to the point, the portrait of Jesus and the one’s he loves (Martha and her sister), creates a rich sense of intimacy and affection and this ties in with Jesus’ demonstration of his love and solidarity with his own (John 13:1).

Meals confirm Jesus’ special role as host and provider when he feeds others or his status as honored guest when they feed him. It is clear that Jesus presides in both the footwashing

34. ‘With its blatant insincerity and inadequate assessment of Jesus as ‘Rabbi’ rather than ‘Lord,’ Judas’ query differs notably from the genuine sorrow and submissive respect of the other disciples, who, with great sadness, asked, ‘Surely it is not I, Lord’ (26:22). Although Rabbi was a title of respect for a teacher (23:7), Lord is more appropriate for Jesus, the sovereign Teacher’ (Heil 1991:34).

35. Some scholars entertain the possibility that the use of αὐθαίνω (reclining) could be a reference to the eucharistic celebration (cf. John 6:11; I Cor 11:20). Such a suggestion assumes that the meal in John 6 a direct reference to the sacrament of eucharist is. Even if this is the case, which I doubt, I am not convinced that one can substantiate an argument on just one semantic equivalent term (cf. John 13:23 13:28). For a more genuine link, many more aspects and elements should be present. On the suggestion that Martha could have been the ‘minister’ at this eucharistic celebration, see Howard-Brook 1994:269. On the (im)possible link between this meal and ‘The service denoting the separation’ or Ḥabdalāh, see Barrett 1976:342; Carson 1991: 427.
and the Last Supper. He is the provider and host and as such it is expected that he would take a morsel of bread and serve the guests. This is exactly what he does. He acts in accordance with the cultural code of hospitality.

Judas, however, violates the cultural codes of hospitality. The consequences are grave. Readers were told that the devil had already put it into Judas’ heart to betray Jesus (John 13:2), a piece of information that echoes where true, loyal discipleship is contrasted with half-hearted discipleship. Half-heartedness is further contrasted with cleanliness in John 13:10b-11. Judas, a half-hearted follower, with unclean motives, does not enjoy the same status as them who had been washed (apparently the rest of the twelve, John 13:10b). According to Neyrey (1995:208) Judas fails in a double sense. He fails the status-transformation ritual (John 13:6-11) as well as the confirmation of membership ceremony (John 13:12-17). In view of failing such cardinal roles and statuses, Judas reveals features of a disloyal and hostile personage. It should however be noted that the double failure in John 13:6-11 and John 12-17 are only indirect and somewhat vague. Yes, in terms of Neyrey’s model of rites of status change and status confirmation, it makes perfectly sense but in terms of the employment of the events in chapter 13, Judas’ hostility and disloyalty is actually disnarrated. Not even his companions realised that Judas is actually the unclean, disloyal one amongst them (cf. John 13:28). His disloyalty remains elusive and is only slightly fleshed out, for the reader, in John 13:26.


6.1 Contamination of meaning

Reading John 13:26 and Matthew 26:23 together with Sirach 31 (in itself alluding and calling forth many other, both real and imaginable texts), means that levels of meaning glide over each other – they mean each other to such an extent that each text is contaminated by the other. The one putting his hand in the bowl with Jesus becomes contaminated by the one with disgusting table manners in Sirach and the disgusting manners in Sirach becomes contaminated by Judas, doing exactly that in Matthew 26:23. In John 13:26, the act of Jesus, presiding at the meal, becomes contaminated by the good manners of the one serving the guests first in Sirach 13. Texts glide over into texts and personages over into personages. One could view such gliding over in terms of the two axes, mentioned above: through grouping and juxtaposition a metonymical relationship is established with the result that, new conceptualisations are pushed and invited to the surface (metaphor). Reading Sirach is now done in terms of the frame created by Matthew and John and reading John and Matthew is now done in terms of the frame invited by Sirach! The implication of this cross-pollination is a relativisation of chronology. Former and later become secondary issues. Not linearity, but supplementary – identity in difference. Inscribed in the logic of linearity is the uncontaminable logic of difference.

6.2 Contextualising and metaphorising

The sayings in Sirach achieves its effecting in John and Matthew by means of contextualised narrativity (cf. Williams 1981, 1987) in the sense that the saying now functions within the interplay of

36. Cf. Brown’s (1978:550) translation of ballein as ‘induced’ and Haenchen’s (1980:455) as ‘schon ins Herz gegeben hatte’. Whose heart is intended? The devil’s own heart of Judas’ heart? If we opt for the devil’s heart it means that the devil has made up his (own) mind that Judas should betray Jesus. Thus, Judas became an instrument in the hand of the devil and can not be held directly responsible for the deed. The devil actually dictated him to do it. On the other hand, it can also mean Judas’ heart: the devil had put into Judas’ heart that Judas should betray Jesus. Carson (1991:462) comments: ‘Either way, the devil and Judas are now in a conspiracy of evil to bring Jesus to the cross, a conspiracy fleshed out in vv. 18,19,21-30: ch. 18’.

37. Tolmie 1995:153 specifies ‘echo’ as ‘internal homodiegetic analepsis at the story level and have a repetitive function’.
a specific set of frames, constructed by a reader. The reader, through a process of textual exchange, does this by embedding the sayings within the context of Jesus' Last Supper. The process of embedding or inserting one text within another one is described by Kristeva (1986:111) as 'transposition of one (or several) sign-system(s) into another; but since this term has often been understood in the banal sense of 'study of sources', we prefer the term transposition because it specifies that the passage of one signifying system to another demands a new articulation of the thetic – of enunciative and denotative positionality'. Related to the reading process, when a text is made to mean something, it is always by being both separated from and joined with a variety of references. Contextualising, decontextualising and recontextualising form an interlinked relationship. A reader reading John through Matthew through Sirach transposed these texts from the initial context (decontextualisation or 'neutralization') and recontextualise them in a new figuration – Sirach in 'other words' in John and Matthew and vice versa.

John and Matthew are paradigmatic narratisings of the non-narrative sayings in Sirach and thus disrupting the text-typical proverbial sayings of Sirach. The original literary context is deconstructed in the sense of perforating generic boundaries and mixing realms of discourse. However, this is not all. Through paradigmatic narratising, the aphoristic sayings are also reconstructed to bring forth new, imaginative possibilities of signification. To read, or more specifically, to set up a dialogue, in the Bakhtinian sense, between non-linear texts is to create a new, 'third' text. This 'third' text is called a 'symbiont' (Cowart 1993).

Beyond the level of the contextualisation of the sayings in Sirach, there is also a conceptual echo of Sirach in the patterning and interaction of relationships among the characters, specifically Jesus and Judas, in Matthew and John. From a cognitive perspective, conceptual echo creates a metaphorical relationship when an alluding text evokes and uses another text. What is important is to note that the metaphorical combination produces a conceptual image in the reader's mind (Pasco 1994:34). In other words, intertextuality produces a conceptual rhythm and patterning in which characters interact in an imaginative way.

7. Conclusion

My reading for intertextuality is along reverse lines in which the narrative of Jesus' exposure of Judas in John 13:21-30 is illuminated or opened out by means of an etiquette frame presented in Sirach 31. A similar operation is taking place in Matthew 26:23. Judas is betraying himself by means of deed and word (hypocritical question).

My reading assists me to conclude with a brief suggestion for further investigation and scrutiny: In terms of the intertext, opened up by Sirach (31:12-32-13) a frame is created to read John 13:26 and Matthew 26:23 intertextually. In Matthew, Judas betrays Jesus through ill-befitting table manners, but Jesus, acting in terms of befitting table manners, never betrays Jesus (so John 13:26). A traditional banquet, with its own particular table manners and etiquette, is given a new metaphorical quality – a quality of life and death, of accepting, abiding and defection!

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38. This is a pivotal concept in Kristeva's program of intertextuality. Aichele & Phillips (1995:10) quotes Kristeva as follows: The text ... is a permutation of texts, an intertextuality: in the space of a text several utterances drawn from other texts intersect and neutralize one another'.

39. Shakespeare's Midsummer Night's Dream is a clear example of such perforation – tragic scenes intersect with comedy and vice versa. In Mark's Gospel apocalyptic scenes are embedded in narrative material (Mark 13).
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