NGOS, CHURCHES AND THE CHALLENGE OF FOURTH GENERATION PEOPLE-CENTRED DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

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Abstract
This article considers the people-centred development challenges faced by NGOs and churches in South Africa within the context of current global neo-liberal economic ideology and policies. Defining NGOs and churches as overlapping civil society institutions in development, the notions of third and fourth generation development strategies in the work of David Korten are specifically applied. By means of a number of case studies, it is shown how churches in South Africa, like many (secular) NGOs in the development field, find it difficult to adapt to wider, more sophisticated development roles. Like many developmental NGOs, they stick to welfare and community-based approaches to development, identified in Korten’s conceptual framework as first and second generation development strategies. Against this critical perspective, it is proposed that the challenge for NGOs and churches today is to become actively involved in the third and fourth generation modes identified by Korten. A strategic perspective that correlates with what has come to be known as the New Policy Agenda in global development discourses, the notions of ‘limited’ and ‘unlimited’ political space are also introduced here. While presenting a continuing and valid challenge to NGOs and churches within the context of the New Policy Agenda, it is argued that the third generation strategic mode implies a ‘politics of limited space’ for civil society actors like NGOs and churches - in particular as they are confronted in this mode with state actors who do not easily welcome them as meaningful participants in national development. In the light of such limitations, the authors of this article argue that Korten’s notion of fourth generation development strategies holds much promise for authentic action by civil society actors. In this mode churches and many NGOs are challenged to participate in the coalition and movement activities of a transnational civil society. They are presented in the fourth generation mode with a ‘politics of limited space’ in which they can excel as idea- and value-centred organisations and surpass the limitations imposed on them by government and the state in the third generation mode. The authors conclude by applying this perspective specifically to post-apartheid South African society.

1. This article is a revised version of the chapter, ‘NGOs and Churches: Civil Society Actors and the Promise of Fourth Generation Development in South Africa’, that will appear in Coetzee, J, Graaff, J, Hendricks, F and Wood, G (eds.) 2001. Reconstruction, Development and People. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. Forthcoming. With the publication of this revised text the authors aim to also expose a wider theological academic audience to the NGO and church development debate.
1. Introduction

At present a global crisis has emerged within the alternative - or people-centred - development movement. The contours of the crisis are formed partly by an increasing domination of neo-liberal ideologies in global and local policy environments, and partly by the challenges that people-centred development actors face as they attempt to adjust. Civil society actors, specifically non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and churches, represent a good site to investigate this problem.

In this article two challenges faced by people-centred development NGOs in the current global crisis are highlighted. The first is posed by what in global development discourses is referred to as the New Policy Agenda (NPA). The so-called NPA suggests that NGOs mainstream their activities in order to move beyond welfare-type and even community-based responses; consequently, they are challenged to (a) engage with governments and professional development agencies, and (b) influence policies. Yet, the counter-argument is that NGOs that take the NPA on board will, paradoxically, face legitimacy issues. A second major challenge is to redefine development so that non-economic dimensions - such as values and ethics - are included in their strategies.

Our aim in this article is to discuss how development-oriented civil society actors can meet the above challenges. In doing so we use David Korten’s well-known fourfold classification of NGO development strategies. We pay particular attention to the fourth generation development mode from within a global alternative development discourse. In this perspective values and ethics are important components of development strategies. We ground our discussion with references to non-governmental development organisations in South Africa, and address issues raised recently for South African non-governmental development organisations. Examples of such issues include organisational development and managerial efficiency in NGOs (see Amos and Mather 1999), and the reconsideration of NGO-state interaction (see Graaff and Louw 1992). Put differently, we ask which development strategies would enable civil society agents to meet the challenges posed by the development imperative and the New Policy Agenda.

We progress towards a tentative answer by, firstly, defining civil society so as to include churches with NGOs. Next we briefly review David Korten’s (1990) generational framework. We emphasize its usefulness for overcoming a problematic welfare approach to development, as well as for difficulties posed by the New Policy Agenda. However, our case study of the development activities of local churches illustrates how difficult it is for small-scale civil society actors to move beyond the first two strategies. We nevertheless sustain the point of view that Korten’s third generation development strategies presents a vital and valid challenge for first and second generation civil society development actors. We conclude that the fourth generational mode of action in particular, would allow many NGOs - especially churches - to orient themselves around specific values, and to find important allies to their causes. Our basic hypothesis is that such alliances would enable them to do what they do best as idea- and value-centred organisations.

But first we look at the challenges we discussed above in more detail.

2. People-centred development NGOs in the context of global neo-liberalism

In contemporary people-centred and NGO development debates, a growing chorus of critical voices against the current global neo-liberal economic paradigm has arisen. We present the following extract of critical perspectives, which expand on the challenges we identified above:
1. The context in which NGOs presently find themselves is dominated by a neo-liberal economic ideology and policies that are derived from it. Many commentators question whether this ideological and policy framework in its local and global formations hold sufficient benefits for the poor. As Cox (1995: 41) points out, ‘(t)he perception that much of the world’s population is not needed by the global economy seems to have been recognized implicitly (though never openly) by the principal world institutions’ (see Terreblanche 1999: 87). In South Africa shifts in the official development policy framework clearly shows how alternative, people-centred development discourses have been co-opted by neo-liberal economics. Commentators (see Terreblanche 1999; NIEP 1997) maintain that this is why the Reconstruction and Development Programme was displaced by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Macro-Economic Plan.

2. As pointed out in NGO development debates, development NGOs, which take the New Policy Agenda on board, also experience legitimacy problems. The NPA agenda calls on NGOs to ‘scale up’ and ‘mainstream’ their grassroots development activities (cf. Wils 1995: 53) to a level of organisational, managerial and technical proficiency. This would enable them to engage with governments and professional development agencies on an equal footing, and to influence the policy process. But such a move would jeopardize their legitimacy and accountability with their original constituency, purpose, and orientation. Edwards and Hulme (1995: 14) argue that NGO claims to legitimacy depend partly on ‘the strength of their accountability, particularly to the ‘poor’’:

   Indeed, the New Policy Agenda thrusts the question of legitimacy into centre stage, for if NGOs are becoming more responsive to external concerns, what is happening to the links - to their values and mission, and to their supporters and others - through which they claim their right to intervene in development? NGOs do not have to be member-controlled to be legitimate, but they do have to be accountable for what they do if their claims to legitimacy are to be sustained.

3. In development debates, there has been a renewed emphasis on non-economic dimensions in development strategies, particularly the development role played by social values. Positive moral and ethical foundations are seen as a necessary basis for economic success. This has important implications for NGOs and the way they conduct themselves.

   Ramogale (1998), for instance, claims that an exclusive focus on political and economic priorities at the cost of psycho-cultural transformation is wrong. He perceives such a wrong-headed perspective in South Africa’s approach to social reconstruction after apartheid. The successes of Asia and the West, he argues, were determined by a strong value system of some kind - including religious belief systems. Ramogale points to the United States, ‘built largely on the Puritan work ethic’ as an example. He concludes that ‘the failure of African countries to create successful economies and political stability is evidence that current value systems are flawed’ (Ramogale 1998: 14).

   Likewise Development Bank of South Africa economist Mokaba (1998: 17) argues that ‘social capital’ is a necessary condition ‘for any economy to grow’. This involves more than ‘political stability, law and order, a low crime rate and economic policies’. What is required, is ‘discipline, a commitment to productivity, a willingness to learn and a belief in moral values like justice and truth’. For Mokaba the economic success of the ‘Asian Tigers’ has been ‘based upon their powerful accumulation of social capital, their discipline and strong work ethic’. By comparison, South Africa lacks the social capital
on which to build a strong economy. ‘Many years of racially biased policies, ineffective planning, a siege mentality and civic strife’ is to blame. Mokaba suggests the Constitution, Bill of Rights, or economic policies ‘like the RDP or Gear’ cannot rectify the situation. But, he argues, faith communities such as churches could ‘help in a more systematic and focused way to rebuild the social cohesion, social trust, moral values and, in short, the social capital’.

Such discourses on values and ethics in development are in line with the people-centred development perspectives of the last decade or two. From this vantagepoint values are not separate from the current quest among NGOs for new levels of technical and strategic competence and a ‘new development professionalism’. Indeed, ‘alternative’ values should sustain the quest for managerial, technical and research competence (see Korten 1987: 154-156; Chambers 1993: 1-26, 83-105).

Having outlined the problems we wish to address, we now turn to the reasons why we also situate our discussion within the religious sector.

3. Churches in the NGO realm

Ben Turok, politician and scholar, argued that NGOs and churches were overlapping civil society institutions at a conference on their role in the Reconstruction and Development Programme. According to him, the ‘conscience of the RDP must be to a considerable extent in the civil society’s structures’ like NGOs and churches. Both ‘are voluntary and they have a high moral profile’. Because the state operates according to non-voluntary principles, some tension exists ‘between the material power of the state and the economy’ versus the moral power and the voluntary principle of civil society (Turok 1995: 149-150, 165).

Turok’s perspective recalls the shared historical roots of the NGO sector in organised post-war relief and development work. From the earliest stages a strong church and Christian presence existed among development NGOs (OECD 1987: 4-11). As post-war development-oriented phenomena NGOs were newcomers to the voluntary services sector, and first operated in close proximity to the churches. Initially confined to the war-torn countries in the North, these organisations gradually spread to countries in the South. In Latin American countries (see Landim 1987) and South Africa, churches constituted important allies in the liberation struggles and grassroots socio-economic activities of NGOs (Boesak 1995: 20-22; Cloete 1995; cf. Wilson and Ramphele 1989: 7-8, 302-303).

Despite their increasingly secular identity, development-oriented NGOs cannot be understood apart from their religious roots (Landim 1987: 32). In relation to the state and government, development-oriented NGOs originated from the same voluntary, civil society association as churches (cf. Turok 1995). NGOs also shared with churches a similar moral, social, and at times political commitment towards alleviating world poverty and human suffering (cf. OECD 1987: 10). While development-oriented NGOs have taken on a dynamic of their own, church-related bodies, churches and Christian NGOs still form a substantial part of the contemporary NGO movement at present (cf. OECD 1987: 11).

Due to such historical continuity and institutional overlapping, NGOs and churches today face similar demands for strategic innovation. Both types of organisations are challenged by new political and social environments to adopt alternative modes of development engagement. They have to move away from anti-government, liberationist modes of involvement; and also from welfarist, grassroots-community, and project approaches (Amos and Mather 1999: 2, 4; Boesak 1995: 23-25; Nkondo 1995: 139-146; Korten 1990: 141-143; Elliot 1987a, 1987b). Churches and NGOs may even have to
consider co-operation. As Wilt James comments, increasingly scarce funding requires organizations ‘to create co-operative ventures’ rather than to continually compete. He asks whether NGO and faith communities could ‘merge to pursue a common goal, rather than wanting to do their own projects?’ (James 1999: 73-74)

4. David Korean’s generation framework

Korean (1990) distinguishes between four generations of development agents according to their strategies for action, as Table 1 below shows. For Korean, first generation projects provide humanitarian assistance while the other three types supply development assistance. Korean acknowledges that his distinctions are neither pure types nor can they be applied consistently to particular organizations. Instead, individual non-governmental organisations implement a bouquet of programmes, each of which may be classified individually as belonging to a different generation:

First generation strategies involve direct delivery of services to meet needs such as food, health care, shelter and schools. The benefits derived from such strategies depend on the funds, staff and administrative capabilities of the concerned NGOs. Beneficiaries are regarded as passive victims, such as ‘the poor’, or refugees (Korten 1990: 115). The underlying assumption is that a little intervention will help people to recover; and then the economy would provide the needed opportunities. First generation attempts to educate the public are usually incorporated into a fund-raising appeal - often using tragic visual symbols such as starving children (Korten 1990: 116). Korten concludes that ‘relief efforts remain an essential and appropriate response to emergency situations that demand immediate and effective humanitarian action ... However, relief and assistance offered little more than a temporary alleviation of the symptoms of underdevelopment.’ (Korten 1990: 118)

Second generation strategies aim to develop ‘the capacities of people to better meet their own needs through self-reliant local action. The emphasis is on benefits that will be sustained by the community beyond the period of NGO assistance.’ Examples of second generation strategies include efforts at developing capacities, through training of preventative health committees or community councils. Other instances include training people in different agricultural practices, in building wells or feeder roads. Second generation strategies may follow on the realisation that needs are greater than the NGO’s capacity to meet them. This type focuses on groups; for instance, women or agricultural workers (Korten 1990: 118). The community is viewed as partners who are expected to help with decision-making and implementation. A radical manifestation of this mode of engagement combines education with political strategies to mobilise people against local power elites. Proponents view the problem as a lack of education alongside the presence of political constraints, such as ‘exploitative relationships at the local level’ (Korten 1990: 120).

Third generation strategies include attempts to change local, national, and global policies and institutions. They are based on the realisation that self-reliance strategies are likely to be sustainable ‘only so long as they are linked into a supportive national development system. Since existing systems tend to be hostile to... such initiative’, it is essential to change them. NGOs should consistently advocate such change, and co-operate with national agencies to re-orient the latter’s policies. The aim is to ‘strengthen broadly-based local control over resources... These strategies may also involve the creation of new institutions of significant size to provide essential local services on a sustained, self-financing basis.’ (Korten 1990: 120) The shortcomings of a third (or second-generation strategy) are that ‘it requires countless replications in millions of communities’ if ‘just, sustainable, and inclusive outcomes’ are to be achieved (Korten 1990: 123).
Fourth generation strategies generally occur where an NGO engages ‘in movement facilitation as a major program strategy’ (Korten 1990: 128, 131, n. 25). The theory of action that informs this mode ‘points to an inadequate mobilizing vision as the root cause for our development failure’ (Korten 1990: 127). The core objective of fourth generation strategies is to mobilise people’s movements around alternative people-centred development. Korten argues that there is a need for strategies which at a broader - ultimately global - scale generate ‘independent action by countless individuals and organizations across national boundaries, all supporting a shared ideal’ (Korten 1990: 124). Facilitating organisations have to instill an alternative development vision in the public consciousness, ‘adequate to mobilize voluntary action on a national or global scale’. The fourth generation voluntary organisation has to ‘coalesce and energize self-managing networks over which it has no control... through the power of ideas, values, and communication links’. All forms of media, education, study groups, and social networks have to be used to ‘energize voluntary action by people both within and outside their formal organizations in support of social transformation’. An example of fourth generation strategies is support by organisations for women’s or environmental movements (Korten 1990: 127).

Korten’s work seems to be linear and hierarchical. His bias towards third and fourth generation development strategies could preclude a comprehensive approach that also addresses immediate conditions of material poverty. Conceptually, Korten’s use of ‘generations’ suggests a unilinear but also a temporal evolution between types. Biggs and Neame (1995: 35) argue that organised attempts at institutional change have occurred since the previous century, including women’s political rights and anti-slavery movements. They also object to Korten’s suggestion that a change in strategy from broader orientations towards relief and welfare work implies a step backwards. Such re-orientations, they argue, may be necessitated by radical changes in particular socio-political contexts - for example, outbreak of warfare, as demonstrated by the example of Kosovo.

Despite the criticisms, Korten’s work provides a powerful heuristic device whose weaknesses can be overcome if the ‘generations’ can be viewed as dimensions of development. Then all types of programmes can be accommodated in a particular context alongside a simultaneous movement towards fourth generation approaches. Such a comprehensive approach can be visualised in terms of an ‘onion skin’ strategy, which involves ‘multiple types of layered intervention’. The ‘outer layer of welfare-orientated activity protects... inner layers of material service delivery that act as nuclei for a core strategy dedicated to transformation’ (Fowler 1993: 334-335).

In the case studies that follow, we use concepts from Korten to analyse outreach programmes of local Methodist congregations. Korten’s four types of development programmes are employed to construct an index, which indicate the orientation of congregations, by noting the number of their programmes which can be allocated to each type. We believe the data show that individual local congregations are not likely to be involved in attempts to change national policies (third generation strategies), or to mobilise national or global people movements (fourth generation strategies). We interpret the presence of other types as evidence for secondary and perhaps tertiary orientations.
Table 1: Strategies of Development-Oriented NGOs: Four Generations (Source: Korten 1990: 117)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERATION</th>
<th>First Relief &amp; welfare</th>
<th>Second Community development</th>
<th>Third Sustainable systems development</th>
<th>Fourth People’s movements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem definition</td>
<td>Shortage</td>
<td>Local inertia</td>
<td>Institutional &amp; policy constraints</td>
<td>Inadequate mobilising vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time frame</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Project life</td>
<td>Ten to twenty years</td>
<td>Indefinite future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Individual or family</td>
<td>Neighbourhood or village</td>
<td>Region or nation</td>
<td>National or global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief actors</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>NGO plus community</td>
<td>All relevant public and private institutions</td>
<td>Loosely defined networks of people &amp; organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO role</td>
<td>Doer</td>
<td>Mobiliser</td>
<td>Catalyst</td>
<td>Activist/Educator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management orientation</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Project management</td>
<td>Strategic management</td>
<td>Coalescing &amp; energising self-managing networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development education</td>
<td>Starving children</td>
<td>Community self-help</td>
<td>Constraining policies and institutions</td>
<td>Spaceship Earth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Korten in South Africa: development programmes in Methodist congregations

The brief descriptions of two congregations below illustrate how civil society organisations remain locked in a welfare or community-based mode, despite some potential for moving beyond it. We examine church programmes, which aim to improve the quality of life of its recipients in terms of socio-economic and other indicators that can broadly be viewed as 'development'.

The case studies are drawn from the Methodist Church of Southern Africa (MCSA), the second largest denomination in South Africa after the Roman Catholic church, and third largest religious grouping after the African Independent Churches (see Froise 1992). The Methodist Church embarked on a deliberate institutional transformation programme entitled 'Journey to a New Land' in 1993. As part of this project, congregations were urged 'to engage in development programmes' (Storey 1995: 25). As the Journey was projected as a bottom-up exercise, it did in effect aspire to be a community-empowerment strategy - Korten's second generation. We consider whether the Journey to the New Land helped Methodist congregations to move beyond welfare-type development programmes. In order to provide an answer, Korten's fourfold typology is adapted to measure the development programmes of Methodist congregations.

The data for the case study was gathered between May and June 1999 from five congregations in five regional circuits of the District of the Cape of Good Hope (see Venter 1999). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with eight clergy and one lay leader. The sample was not random, and so the discussion remains exploratory. Interviewees indicated that at least twenty-two outreach programmes were conducted on behalf of people who were not members of the congregation. These ranged from the physical construction of homes, feeding schemes, support groups for parents and mothers, basic skills training (sewing, literacy), and regular involvement with old age homes and children's homes. Not all programmes may have been listed.

First generation-oriented strategies: Bellville Methodist Church's 'halfway house for unwed mothers'

Bellville Methodist Church's outreach programmes included running 'a halfway house for unwed mothers' (the New Life Centre), building homes for the elderly, a recruitment course predominantly aimed at non-church people (known as Alpha), and several feeding schemes. Nine task groups focused on social action, pastoral care, the elderly, prayer, cell groups, finance, worship (programme, preaching), youth (outside and inside Sunday school). Other outreach programmes included a group which helped abused people (children, wives). In addition, the church was beginning to be involved with street children, so-called 'vagrants', prostitutes, Aids, and a hospice. With reference to assistance rendered to the homeless, Minister Pete Taljaard spoke proudly of 'people who have come out of the bush, who are now employed, and living in flats'.

The project for unwed mothers emerged in response to the legalisation of abortion, and was not influenced by the Journey, according to Taljaard. He felt that the MCSA's statement on the legalisation of abortion was 'very weak ... which we rejected'. The congregation sent a letter to the Presiding Bishop. 'We accept that life is sacred from conception on', Taljaard said, 'and cannot accept the alternative. The Bible is very clear on this.' After the letter, we said that you cannot make a statement and not do anything about it. So we conceived of a ministry to unwed mothers, as a statement against abortion. We opened a home which has been going now for 18 months. We have already had 19 ladies
pass through this ministry. We are building a flat on top for house parents. At present there is only one lady. We are building with a view to house nine or ten [women], building as halfway houses. (Taljaard interview)

Taljaard believed that most of the programmes employ second generation strategies. He viewed the New Life Centre as an empowerment centre which helped women to discover dignity, and to find employment. Taljaard referred to an employment project which he believed applied a fourth generation strategy, as it was based on a network of different churches in the area. Personal information of unemployed job-seekers were distributed across the network, and so ‘we have been able to employ over 35 people over the last year’ (Taljaard interview).

But closer inspection of Korten’s categories shows that Bellville Methodist Church’s outreach programmes utilised first generation strategies. The effect on the community is indirect, and in scope the programmes are aimed at individuals - some who undoubtedly were empowered to help themselves. The ‘unwed mothers’ project is interesting because it was inspired by state policy and legislation, and so had the potential to generate third and fourth generation strategies. Yet, the opportunity was not taken up to engage with other movements on the subject, to mobilise people to pressurise the state to change its policy. Similarly, Bellville Methodist Church’s projects for the elderly do not qualify as second generation strategies as the role, scope, and management orientation remains first generation. The unusual aspect here is that a local congregation took up a task typically addressed by the denomination as a whole. Like other denominations, the MCSA has built several children’s and old age homes.

Second generation-oriented strategies: Claremont Methodist Church’s community housing initiative

Taken together, Claremont Methodist Church’s outreach programmes indicated an overall welfare orientation, as three out of four programmes were of this type - with a housing initiative as the exception. Congregants were involved in a soup kitchen, a Methodist children’s home, and a support group for mothers. All four were started after the formal launch of the Journey to the New Land in 1994. Claremont’s welfare orientation was prompted as much by historical tradition as by the class-base of residents in their context. Community-development was made irrelevant by the relative wealth of people in the immediate neighbourhood, and was also precluded by the 70% of the congregation who live between 3 to 6 km from the Sunday meeting place. An additional 20% live further than 7 km away. As we will show, a project that engages the economic and political systems that support, for example, unemployment, was inhibited by the general welfare orientation and by the ideology of the congregation.

The housing initiative started as a welfare programme, but seemed to be evolving into a community development strategy. The project centred on the Harare informal settlement in the black township of Khayelitsha, Cape Town. According to Claremont Methodist Church’s pastor, Grant Hopkins, the initiative developed as a ‘direct result’ of the Journey. The specific focus was prompted by ‘our need to address the housing shortage in our country, that the church has something to say about that’. The involvement in a black township arose out of the perception that ‘those without houses are primarily our black... and coloured members of our congregation’. Encouraged by the Journey process to work out a mission statement, the congregation adopted ‘a more outward focus. And also a commitment to crossing racial barriers’, Hopkins said.
The housing project was managed by two full-time contract staff; the project manager -who is not a member of the congregation - and a communications person. Hopkins estimated 'that over the initial three year period about 30 people [were] involved in various ways and at various times over the project'. Initially a committee of 10 to 12 'mainly young professional people' were gathered 'to give up their skills and time'. The group began to build up a relationship with the Methodist community in Harare. The aim was 'to explore how we can work with them in building their own houses'. In December 1998 the first house was built, and four more were under construction then. Hopkins explained that:

People themselves build, but the teams that go out, if they are there at the right time, will get their hands dirty - even if it is only for a couple of hours. And at the end of the year we have what is called a 'blitzbuild', where we take our folk to actually live there for two weeks and we try to build 15 houses in one go. And we just get stuck in! (Hopkins interview)

The leadership intended the whole congregation to become involved, one way or another. Presently teams of between five and fifteen people go out 'to visit and have meals with the people. If there is any building to do, they will do little bit of building'. The idea was to take each of the 32 cell groups in the congregation, 'one or three at a time'. Later those that were in the congregation but who were not in cell groups, would be signed up.

The exact fit between this strategy and Korten's second generation strategies was unclear from the data. Hopkins' opinion was that the housing project is a fourth generation strategy. Yet, the following quotation suggests that thinking about the project remains in first generation terms. Hopkins indicated that 'we are trying to look at the Harare community, how we structure the community, in terms of town planning, parks; we are trying to work with the community on that, parks, trees, swimming pools ... trying to give it a kind of neighbourhood feel'.

Yet, second generation-type strategies (skills building) and fourth generation-type strategies (networking with macro-actors) seemed to be emerging in the alliances that had been established with national and international development organisations. These included the Triple Trust (a funder and educator) and Habitat for Humanity (a self-help housing group). The link with Tripl Trust was 'to start skills workshops, actually giving people skills'; including 'the basics - like sewing, bricklaying, plumbing, electrical, computer skills, those kind of things. We have already tried to grow what you could call financial skills, teaching people about loans, houses, how to work with the bank.' Also important 'is our relationship people-wise', with congregants 'visiting and maybe staying over'.

The above ambiguity suggests that the housing initiative is rooted in a first generation paradigm, but may be in transition to a second generation strategy. To some extent traces of a fourth generation approach is present. But unlike Korten's fourth generation strategy, the goal of the project is obviously not to establish networks in order to mobilise a people's movement. Third generation strategies are excluded, as seems to be typical for most local congregations.

In conclusion, the two congregations showed little evidence of moving beyond the welfare mode of addressing needs. Obviously the extremely limited scale of the research severely damps the generalisability of the conclusions. Yet, of the 22 programmes only one was not a first generation project.

6. A 'politics of limited space' versus a 'politics of unlimited space'

In the remaining part of this article we now focus on the prospects of NGOs and churches to engage in third and fourth generation development strategies. Having given
evidence in the previous section of particularly churches’ apparent limited capacity and vision to surpass first and second generation modes of social involvement, we regard the notions of a ‘politics of limited space’ and a ‘politics of unlimited space’ useful concepts to define the difficulties but also opportunities faced by NGOs and churches in their anticipated strivings to mainstream and scale up to third and fourth generation modes of involvement.

We claim that third generation development strategies in particular imply a ‘politics of limited space’ for civil society actors like NGOs and churches. Third generation development strategies operate within national borders, and are hence subject to state control. This factor places significant restrictions on how actors of development are allowed to operate. Such strategies are still significant as part of a progressive and necessary mode of development. Yet, limited space refers to a secular, public and organised space that does not easily welcome development actors as meaningful participants. NGOs and churches are confronted with a specialised terrain for which they may have little skills, appreciation and experience. Such a limited space characterised the operations of development NGOs under apartheid, and may come to do so again in a future South Africa.

Graaff and Louw point out that state attitudes towards the NGO sector had improved considerably during the political transition. Yet, they say, conflict is inevitable where different classes, interests, strategies and target populations are represented by the state, on the one hand, and NGOs, on the other. In a normalised political context, continued radical orientations of NGO staff could well result in attempts by the state and local governments to control or eliminate NGOs (Graaff and Louw 1992: 29-30).

Graaff and Louw conclude that ideological differences, training and bureaucratic functions of state officials lead them to be inherently hostile towards the people-centred activities of NGOs. True state-NGO cooperation would only be possible through retraining and reorientation. Due to the often conflictual nature of state-NGO interaction, NGOs tend to operate ineffectively within the broader socio-political environment, of which they reveal limited insight. NGOs tend to isolate themselves from state bodies, and so to be politically ineffective, just as they divorce themselves from the economic and private sectors (Graaff and Louw 1992: 27-28).

While the ‘politics of limited space’ mark third generation strategies, we hold that the fourth generation mode represents unlimited space because it operates on the global (or transnational) stage. Development can here be viewed as a ‘politics of ideas’, which brings about change by the power of values, transformed relationships and communication. Fourth generation activities emphasise the building of community, of national and global civil society. ‘This new conceptualization means shifting the development and political discourse toward civil society and the vital actors (e.g. NGOs, social movements, people’s organizations) that shape it.’ (Riker 1995: 198)

Fourth-generation strategies call on NGOs and churches to participate in movement building; to actively support and participate in transformative people’s movements. This makes people’s organisations - the fourth sector - of primary importance; not the state, government, donors, or NGOs themselves. In the fourth generation mode, activities such as networking, coalition- and relationship-building take central stage (Korten and Quizon 1995: 160; see also Graaff and Louw 1992: 31). From this global perspective ‘the concept of ‘nation-building’ is as ‘outdated and incomplete as it is conceived largely as a state project’ (Riker 1995: 197). By contrast third generation strategies concentrate on government and the state.
Fourth generation development strategies, then, represent ‘a new mode of international politics’ (Riker 1995: 199). As a strategy of new alliances across national boundaries and around common issues, this development mode serves to protect NGOs in their confrontations with governments and states (Heyzer 1995: 12; see also Riker 1995). But this mode also presents an efficient counter to mainstream, government-dominated development policy, supported by major international donor institutions such as the World Bank (Heyzer, ibid; Bhatt 1995: 86-87; Riker 1995: 199).

Yet, third generation development strategies remain an essential complementary aspect to the agenda of fourth generation development. The underlying goal of fourth generation strategies is to bring about the policy, structural, organisational and technological changes envisioned in the third generation framework. By implication, NGOs and churches have to continually refocus on third generation goals while they build coalition- and relationships in the fourth generation mode.

7. Conclusion: remaining difficulties and challenges

We have argued that David Korten’s notion of fourth generation development strategies holds much promise for authentic action by civil society actors. By orienting themselves to this strategy, development actors, such as NGOs and churches, can make a vital contribution to a new value construct that seems as necessary for long-term development in South African society as elsewhere.

The ‘unlimited’ space of fourth generation strategies is more appropriate to numerous civil society actors that had been educated in a particular ‘politics of ideas’. This mode would allow many NGOs and churches to perceive their primary task as changing the consciousness and behaviour of persons and of the state. In such a space they would not be restricted and marginalised by the institutional processes of policy-making. And they would participate in a larger transnational civil society space - in a ‘movement politics’, a ‘politics of connections’ - unconfined by set places, spaces and institutions (Swart 1997: 14-15; Walker 1994: 699-700). NGOs and churches would find much in common with the new social movements, which are driven forward by similar values on the issues of peace, human rights, women, environment, democracy, and people-centred development.

NGOs and churches would be able to do what they do best in this unlimited space: to appeal to people across boundaries and cultures. Their general, but sometimes also specific ethical teachings, would call for a civil society audience which overlaps with their own constituency to a considerable extent. And in this sphere they would experience an emerging new appraisal for the contribution of religion and value-centred teachings to development (cf. Swart 1997: 9-10; Korten 1990: 188-191, 223). Such an estimation is already visible in the comments of Ramogale and Mokaba, as we have seen earlier. And Turok and Korten are among those who propagate a fundamental common value-centred role for NGOs and churches in development that radically moves beyond previous and prevailing modes of development.

But the involvement of NGOs and churches in fourth generation development strategies remains an ideal. This mode of engagement, no less than the third generation, challenges these actors to scale up their activities. As the above case studies and also other critical reflections suggest (Korten 1990: 141-143; Elliot 1987a; 1987b: 1-16, 39-50), the majority of NGOs and churches, locally and elsewhere, still tend to be confined to first and second generation understandings. The actual participation of NGOs and churches in networking, coalition- and relationship-building strategies remains unrealised. This has negative
implications for the prospects of many NGOs, churches, and the communities with which they associate.

Many such actors face extreme poverty and isolation (cf. Graaff and Louw 1992: 31), lack of resources, orientation, skills, infrastructure and access to modern communication systems and technology (cf. Friedmann 1995: 14; Melkote 1991: 231-233). As a result, they may view participation in fourth generation (and third generation) development as unlikely, which presents a serious and remaining obstacle to realising fourth generation development. In response, more powerful actors (NGOs, churches, donors) in both the North and South that are already operating in fourth generation mode, could take up the task to empower more isolated and deprived agents (cf. Elliot 1987a: 64-68).

In post-apartheid South Africa the new public debate on morality and values by politicians, academics and the media could help civil society development actors to fulfil their fourth generation promise. The debate has been raised by scholars from religious disciplines (e.g. Kretzschmar and Hulley 1998a, 1998b) as well as others (e.g. Ramogale 1998, Mokaba 1998). Similar sentiments are heard at NGO and moral summits and conferences (see Conference Proceedings, Multi-Event 1999).

To fulfil their promise, NGOs and churches have to transform their first and second generation welfare and project-centred development strategies into third and particularly fourth generation ones. They also have to relate such transformed understandings to the new ethic and moral discourses in South Africa, to the new global and local social movement discourses, and to the actual movements that they represent. Failure to make such connections will mean that their own discourses will remain largely a-political, separated from poor and grassroots communities, ideologically conservative, abstract, and confined to their own sectors.

A fourth (and third) generation mode of engagement for civil society development actors can only meaningfully take place on the basis of an extended dialectical, reflexive, cooperative, collective and political framework. The comparative view that we presented in this article calls for a new relationship between these actors themselves, which would lead them to adopt new forms of collective action, mutual learning and cooperation. Under these conditions, NGOs and churches would have to exchange existing absolute religious, theological and ideological identities for new ones of solidarity.
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